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Direct Democracy Upside Down
Uwe Serdült and Yanina Welp
Abstract
Over the last decades, provisions for direct democracy mechanisms 
increasingly have been added to new constitutions and more questions have 
been decided by referendum votes around the world in consolidated, new, or 
reestablished democracies. These mechanisms are usually classified according 
to who initiated the call: mandatory referendum (by law), referendum by 
legislatures and office holders (top-down), or citizen referendum and initiative 
(bottom-up). While the first and the second types have been studied in a 
comparative approach, the third remains an issue for case studies mainly (e.g., 
Switzerland, Liechtenstein, and Italy). However, despite incomplete research, 
bottom-up direct democracy is seen as a way for citizenry to exercise veto 
power (refusing laws or constitutional amendments) or to innovate (propose 
bills). This essay challenges this common assumption by analyzing all the 
experiences of bottom-up direct democracy at the national level worldwide 
(1874-2009). It is suggested that even so-called bottom-up referendums could 
be used (a) to concentrate power, (b) to serve as a partisan strategy, and, rather 
exceptionally, (c) to empower citizens and civil society. While the first type 
shows a similar pattern to top-down direct democracy in hybrid regimes or 
nonconsolidated democracies, and the second type works as a political party’s 
strategy to increase membership and votes, only the last type could reinvigorate 
democracy, although to what extent this is happening needs further research.
Key words:  Referendum, initiative, direct democracy mechanisms, political 
parties, civil society, democracy.
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Bottom-Up Referendums: Civil Society versus Political Parties
Comparative research shows that provisions for referendums and citizens’ 
initiatives are increasingly being added to new constitutions. Worldwide, 
more and more issues are decided by direct votes of citizens.1 We define direct 
democracy mechanisms as a set of procedures allowing citizens to make political 
decisions directly through a vote, without the involvement of a parliament or 
a government. These mechanisms can be grouped conveniently according to 
who started the call for a vote. The vote can be prescribed by a constitution 
or a law and, thus, be automatic; it can be triggered without the collection of 
signatures by the authorities in power (be it a parliament, a government, or 
often a president); or it can depend on a collection of signatures in order to, on 
the one hand, block decisions post factum or, on the other hand, introduce legal 
provisions independent of previous legislative action. Automatically triggered 
referendums often are used to ratify constitutional reforms, territorial changes, 
or international treaties. There is some agreement about the value of this 
particular type of referendum as a source of legitimization in contemporary 
democracies.2 Conversely, several scholars have alerted against the use of 
referendums triggered ex officio, in particular, when activated by a president, 
who is called to ratify decisions or to resolve conflict between political powers, 
frequently the executive and the legislative branches. Historical evidence raises 
a certain amount of scepticism toward this type of direct democracy because 
of its risk of manipulation and its “plebiscitarian” nature.3 In this essay, we 
deal with the third mechanism, requiring the collection of signatures to be 
activated, frequently called a vote triggered from the bottom up.
Unlike Kaufmann and Waters,4 we do not include the mandatory 
referendum as a citizen-empowering instrument of direct democracy since 
it is constitutionally required and, thus, automatic. In accordance with 
Papadopoulos,5 we focus on those mechanisms where the initiative comes 
from the citizens themselves, a certain number of whom demand a vote that the 
1 Simon Hug and George Tsebelis, “Veto Players and Referendums around the World,” Journal 
of Theoretical Politics 14, no. 4 (2002): 465-515; Yanina Welp and Uwe Serdült, Armas de 
Doble Filo. La participación ciudadana en la encrucijada [Double-edged weapons: Citizen 
participation at the crossroads] (Buenos Aires: Prometeo, 2009); and David Altman, Direct 
Democracy Worldwide (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
2 Andreas Auer, “National Referendums in the Process of European Integration: Time for Change,” 
in The European Constitution and National Constitutions: Ratification and Beyond, ed. Anneli 
Albi and Jacques Ziller (Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2007), 261-271.
3 Mónica Barczak, “Representation by Consultation? The Rise of Direct Democracy in Latin 
America,” Latin American Politics & Society 43, no. 3 (2001): 37-59.
4 Bruno Kaufmann and Dane M. Waters, Direct Democracy in Europe (Durham, NC: Carolina 
Academic Press, 2004).
5 Yannis Papadopoulos, “Analysis of Functions and Dysfunctions of Direct Democracy: Top-
Down and Bottom-Up Perspectives,” Politics & Society 23, no. 4 (1995): 421-448.
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political authorities have to accept. We also include recall when it is activated 
by signature collection. Despite some criticism of direct democracy, such as 
the power of lobby groups to activate and control direct democracy, or the 
question of the competence of the electorate,6 in recent years, there has been 
a growing interest in bottom-up mechanisms and a call for more bottom-up 
direct democracy, such as the request for a European citizens’ initiative,7 the 
spread of direct and participatory democracy at national and local levels,8 and 
an opinion in favor of that mechanism.9
It is argued that institutional provisions for bottom-up direct democracy 
allow citizens to become veto players, and in Tsebelis’s words, actors whose 
agreement is necessary for a change in the legislative status quo.10 Bottom-
up democracy also allows for the citizenry to become innovators. Citizens 
can refuse a law passed by a parliament, propose a new law or modify an 
existing one, or propose constitutional amendments through signature 
collection designed to be concluded by a vote.11 Bottom-up direct democracy 
is supposed to produce social accountability and to reduce the distance 
between representatives’ actions and citizens’ preferences.12 However, there 
is no overall agreement on the relation between representative democracy and 
bottom-up direct democracy.
According to Kaufmann and Waters, wherever direct democracy exists, 
“it has not replaced representative democracy but has complemented the work 
of parliamentarians and political parties.”13 Others, such as Setälä, have stated 
that,
6 Arthur Lupia and John Matsusaka, “Direct Democracy: New Approaches to Old Questions,” 
Annual Review of Political Sciences 7 (2004): 463-482.
7 Treaty on European Union, art. 11, par. 4, requires the signatures of one million citizens of the 
European Union in order to activate an initiative to directly address the European Commission.
8 Archon Fung and Erik Wright, Deepening Democracy: Institutional Innovations in Empowered 
Participatory Governance (London: Verso, 2003).
9 Bruno Kaufmann, The European Citizens’ Initiative Handbook: Your Guide to the World’s First 
Transnational Direct Democratic Tool (Luxembourg: Green European Foundation, 2010).
10 Hug and Tsebelis, “Veto Players and Referendums around the World.”
11 A specific number of signatures is requested in some countries (500,000 for an abrogative 
referendum in Italy, equivalent to one percent of the electorate), whereas in others it 
is a percentage (25 percent in Uruguay for an abrogative referendum, but 10 percent for a 
constitutional one). In some cases, a territorial representation, in addition to the majority of the 
electorate, is required, such as the requirement for a majority of the cantons for constitutional 
changes in Switzerland. Time limits to reject a law and to collect signatures can vary (no period 
in Italy, while in Switzerland it is one hundred days). In some cases, there is a turnout threshold 
(Italy, Colombia), while in others there is not (Switzerland).
12 David Altman, “Democracia directa en el continente americano: ¿autolegitimación 
gubernamental o censura ciudadana?” [Direct democracy in the American continent: Self-
legitimation government or citizenship censure?] Politica y Gobierno [Politics and Government], 
no. 2 (2005): 203-232.
13 Kaufmann and Waters, Direct Democracy in Europe, xix.
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an increased number of citizens’ initiatives can be expected 
if citizens become increasingly detached from the traditional 
parties... . Also the number of referendums may rise if 
governmental parties increasingly fail to represent the 
opinions of the majority of voters on a salient issue.14
Dalton goes further, stressing that,
on one side of the democratic spectrum stands the model of 
articulating citizen demands through representation. This 
model often takes the form of party-based parliamentary rule 
and functions primarily through elected representatives... . At 
the other end of the spectrum the model of direct democracy 
is placing control in the hand of the people themselves.15
If the last arguments reflect a current trend, when a constitutional provision 
for bottom-up direct democracy exists, contemporary societies would be 
characterized by a growing divorce between the citizenry and the institutions 
of representative democracy, especially political parties, and an increasing 
intervention of citizenry in the political arena.
However, evidence from the Swiss, Italian, and Uruguayan experiences 
shows that political parties are not necessarily against bottom-up referendums. 
Morel’s study of party attitudes toward referendums concludes with a diverse 
typology showing that direct democracy is not necessarily against parties and 
parties are not automatically against direct democracy.16 Ladner and Brändle 
have challenged the widespread thesis that direct democracy weakens political 
parties. Their study of the Swiss cantons suggests that direct democracy goes 
hand-in-hand with more professional and formalized party organizations.17 
The Uruguayan case demonstrates how useful referendums can be in order 
to mobilize and increase the visibility of a new party in the political arena.18 
14 Maija Setälä, “Referendums in Western Europe-A Wave of Direct Democracy,” Scandinavian 
Political Studies 22 (1999): 333.
15 Russell J. Dalton, Wilhelm P. Bürklin, and Andrew Drummond, “Public Opinion and Direct 
Democracy,” Journal of Democracy 12, no. 4 (2001): 142.
16 Laurence Morel, “Party Attitudes toward Referendums in Western Europe,” West European 
Politics 16, no. 3 (1993): 225-244.
17 Andreas Ladner and Michael Brändle, “Does Direct Democracy Matter for Political Parties?” 
Party Politics 5, no. 3 (1999): 283-302.
18 Yanina Welp and Uwe Serdült, “Reto, competencia y manipulación: Referéndum y poder 
político en América Latina” [Challenge, competition and manipulation: Referendum and 
political power in Latin America], in Democracia participativa vs. representación. Tensiones 
en América Latina [Participatory democracy and representation: Tensions in Latin America], 
coord. Mascareño and Montecinos, Center of Studies of Development, Central University of 
Venezuela, and Center of Regional Development, University of Los Lagos, Chile, 2012.
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The Italian case also has shown that, even if parties are cautious about the 
promotion of referendum votes, nongoverning parties have been the most active 
in setting them up.19 Finally, it must be considered that activating a referendum 
incurs high costs in terms of human and financial resources. In some scenarios, 
political parties could have strong incentives to activate referendums and could 
be more prepared than other actors (e.g., labor unions, NGOs, and individual 
citizens) for such an endeavor. Finally, in nonconsolidated democracies 
or hybrid regimes, experience shows that even if formally following legal 
procedures, some bottom-up direct democracy practices could exhibit a similar 
pattern to top-down direct democracy, with a government controlling or even 
creating social movements to promote an initiative oriented toward reinforcing 
its power. In this particular case, bottom-up direct democracy is turned upside 
down, and the primary function of the instrument perverted.20
Given the growing interest in the subject and the lack of comparative 
studies, this exploratory research aims to identify all national bottom-up direct 
democracy experiences in the world from 1874 (when the first bottom-up 
mechanism was introduced in Switzerland) to 2009. Before continuing, we 
must mention that several scholars also have hinted at the growing importance 
of direct democracy-including bottom-up mechanisms-on the subnational 
level. This is especially relevant for the Swiss cantons, the German Länder, 
and the states of the United States.21 In Germany, the subnational use of 
bottom-up direct democracy mechanisms has increased since the codification 
of the citizens’ initiative in the 1990s in all the Länder. After the reunification 
of Germany, all the new Länder in the former East introduced the citizens’ 
initiative as a consequence of the strong involvement of citizen movements 
in breaking up the communist government; the Western Länder, still without 
this instrument, followed soon thereafter. Citizen-induced votes overturning 
parliamentary legislation in the form of optional referendums were not possible 
until very recently and continue to have ephemeral importance only.22 The 
frequency of bottom-up votes clearly increased from seven between 1945 and 
19 Pier Vincenzo Uleri, “On Referendum Voting in Italy: Yes, No or Non Vote? How Italian Parties 
Learned to Control Referenda,” European Journal of Political Research 41, no. 6 (2002): 863-
883.
20 See Jonathan Wheatley, “Direct Democracy in the Commonwealth of Independent States: The 
State of the Art,” C2D Working Paper Series, no. 28 (2008).
21 Bruno Frey and Alois Stutzer, “Happiness, Economy and Institutions,” Economic Journal 110 
(2000): 918-938; Andreas Ladner and Michael Brändle, “Does Direct Democracy Matter for 
Political Parties?” Party Politics 5 (1999): 283-302; Christina Eder, Adrian Vatter, and Markus 
Freitag, “Institutional Design and the Use of Direct Democracy: Evidence from the German 
Länder,” West European Politics 32, no. 3 (2009): 611-633; and Daniel Smith and Caroline 
Tolbert, Educated by Initiative: The Effects of Direct Democracy on Citizens and Political 
Organizations in the American States (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2004).
22 Andreas Rohner, “Direct Democracy in the German Länder: History, Institutions, and (Mal) 
Functions,” C2D Working Paper Series, no. 38 (2011).
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1989 to fourteen between 1990 and 2009; however, due to sometimes very 
restrictive qualification hurdles, overall success rates are relatively low. In 
the Swiss cantons, we also observe a steady increase in bottom-up votes for 
each decade after 1970 (1970-1979, 229; 1980-1989, 353; 1990-1999, 296; 
and 2000-2009, 372).23 The increase can be attributed to a better organized 
civil society sector and to the fact that the number of required signatures in 
order to trigger the procedure has been left untouched in most cantons, if not 
lowered despite a growing population. For the states in the United States, we 
observe new highs for state-level initiatives for the last two decades as well.24 
One additional and striking case is the growth of recall votes in Peru. Starting 
with 181 local-level recalls in 1997, recalls steadily spread throughout the 
country and occurred 1,541 times between 2008 and 2009.25 However, given 
our intention of dealing with the whole universe of cases, at this stage, we 
could not start data collection and process the thousands of bottom-up votes 
emerging at the subnational level.
Thus, our first goal is to draw the map of bottom-up direct democracy 
experiences on the national level, identifying the number, countries, and 
geographical areas in which they are spreading. Second, we want to test to 
what extent the following scenarios can be identified:
1.   “Citizens as policy makers.” If, as some scholars stress, 
bottom-up direct democracy works as an alternative to 
power distribution in representative democracies, we 
should find an increasing number of citizens or civil 
society organizations playing a role in the activation of 
direct democracy.
2.   “Political parties as the main players.” This, in case bottom-
up direct democracy is just another strategy for opposition 
parties to continue the fight against a policy passed in 
parliament; a party strategy to mobilize (potential) voters; 
or a tactic to place an issue on the agenda.
3.   A “government’s strategy to increase its power.” Bottom-
up direct democracy could be a tool controlled by 
governments.
23 Data extracted from the C2D database: www.c2d.ch (accessed December 14, 2011).
24 The data for the states in the United States can be accessed and downloaded from the Initiative 
and Referendum Institute Web site: www.iandrinstitute.org. Also see, John G. Matsusaka, 
For the Many or the Few: The Initiative, Public Policy, and American Democracy (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2004).
25 Yanina Welp and Uwe Serdült “¿Jaque a la representación? Análisis de la revocatoria de 
mandato en los gobiernos locales de América Latina” [Check to representation? Analysis of the 
recall referendum in local governments of Latin America], in Caleidoscopio de la innovación 
democrática en América Latina [Kaleidoscope of democratic innovation in Latin America], 
comp. Yanina Welp and Laurence Whitehead (México: FLACSO, 2011).
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Even though the citizenry has the final say in all three scenarios, the 
predominance of the first scenario could show an extension of the political game 
to new actors previously excluded from policy-making. The predominance of 
the second scenario could be explained in several ways (crisis of representative 
democracy, power struggle, or partisan strategy), but shows, in any case, that 
political parties continue to play an important role. Option 3 could show that 
even bottom-up direct democracy could be a strategy to reinforce power by the 
(mis)use of public means.
All national referendum votes in the C2D database (http://www.c2d.ch) 
were therefore classified according to who made the call: (1) individuals or 
civil society organizations; (2) political parties in the opposition; or (3) the 
president and/or political parties in government. The promoter was identified 
as the actor who started the request, but this does not necessarily mean that the 
actor did not have the support of others (from a political party or from civil 
society). Because we focus on the activation of the instrument, we took binding 
as well as nonbinding votes into account. While further research should be 
done to analyze links among actors, here we contribute by analyzing, in the last 
part of the study, some cases from each category in order to identify trends on 
the relation between political parties and civil society organizations.
Mapping the Evolution of Bottom-Up Direct Democracy
Institutional provisions and experiences with referendums have been 
increasing not only in Western countries but also in post-communist countries, 
Latin America, and Asia. In the post-communist countries, most of the new 
constitutions were ratified by this procedure; in Europe, referendums have been 
quite intensively used for issues linked with European integration,26 while in 
Latin America, there has been an increase in the use of referendums in countries 
such as Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela. However, even though institutional 
provisions for and practices of bottom-up direct democracy are increasing, 
these are rare in comparison to mandatory and top-down mechanisms of direct 
democracy.27
26 Simon Hug, Voices of Europe: Citizens, Referendums and European Integration (Lanham: MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2002).
27 Data from the C2D’s (www.c2d.ch) and Beat Müller’s database (http://www.sudd.ch/); also, 
reports provided by IDEA in Direct Democracy: The International IDEA Handbook, 2008. For 
Europe, see Kaufmann and Waters, Direct Democracy in Europe; for post-communist countries, 
see Wheatley, “Direct Democracy in the Commonwealth of Independent States,” and Andreas 
Auer and Michael Bützer, Direct Democracy: The Eastern and Central European Experience 
(Hants, England: Aldershot, 2001); for Latin America, see Welp and Serdült, Armas de Doble 
Filo; and for Asia, see Jau-Yuan Hwang, Direct Democracy in Asia: A Reference Guide to the 
Legislations and Practices (Taipei: IRI-Taiwan Foundation for Democracy, 2007), and Jung-
Ok Lee and Bruno Kaufmann, Global Citizens in Charge: How Modern Direct Democracy 
Can Make Our Representative Democracy Truly Representative (Seoul: Korea Democracy 
Foundation, 2009).
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Table 1. Bottom-Up Direct Democracy (1874-2009)
Countries with Bottom-Up Institutional Provisions
Referendum
# %
Western Europe1
(4)
Switzerland 336 62.6
Italy 62 11.5
Liechtenstein 56 10.4
San Marino 14 2.6
Post-communist 
countries
(14)
Latvia 10 1.9
Slovakia 5 0.9
Lithuania 9 1.7
Hungary 7 1.3
Slovenia 3 0.6
Ukraine 4 0.7
Serbia 1 0.2
Georgia 1 0.2
Macedonia FYR 1 0.2
Albania, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russian 
Federation 0 0
(Estonia) 2 2 0.4
Latin America
(8)
Uruguay 11 2.0
Colombia 1 0.2
Venezuela 1 0.2
Bolivia,3 Costa Rica, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Peru 0 0
Africa
(6)
Cape Verde, Ethiopia, Liberia, Niger, Togo, and 
Uganda
0 0
Asia
(3)
Taiwan 4 0.7
Philippines, Turkmenistan 0 0
Oceania 
(3)
Palau 5 0.9
Micronesia 0 0 
New Zealand 4 0.7
Total 38 Countries 537 100
Source: C2D database, www.c2d.ch .
Note 1:  Cases such as Portugal are not included because, even if citizens can collect 
signatures, the parliament decides whether to call for a referendum vote (art. 115, 
Portuguese Constitution of 1976). 
Note 2:  In Estonia, the constitution of 1920 allowed for bottom-up referendums. Within that 
framework, two referendums were held, one in 1923 and one in 1933. However, the 
mechanism is not included in the current constitution. See, Ero Liivik, “Legitimacy 
through Direct Democracy in the EU Member State: Direct Democratic Initiatives 
in the Estonian Parliament,” Proceedings of the Institute for European Studies-
Journal of Tallinn University of Technology, no. 8 (2010): 82-99.
Note 3:  For Bolivia, the regional-level referendums on the autonomy statutes are not 
included.
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While at least 156 countries provide for mandatory or optional 
referendums, only thirty-eight countries have provisions for bottom-
up mechanisms, and in six of these cases (Russian Federation, Ethiopia, 
Kyrgyzstan, Niger, Liberia, and Uganda) only the recall of members of 
parliament can be activated by the citizenry. Therefore, citizens are allowed to 
participate directly in the legislative and/or in the constitution-making process 
in only thirty-two countries.
As we can see in table 1, the countries with these provisions have very 
different political histories, although there has been a general trend toward the 
inclusion of these mechanisms in post-communist countries (fourteen countries 
have provisions for direct democracy). Despite a common belief, bottom-up 
mechanisms are not particularly developed in most consolidated democracies. 
In Western Europe, only four countries provide for them (Switzerland, Italy, 
Liechtenstein, and San Marino), while they are not included at all at the federal 
level in the United States, Canada, or Australia. In New Zealand, they are 
regulated by the Citizens Initiated Referenda Act, approved in 1993, though 
due to the nonbinding character of the result, the system has been highly 
criticized and up to now has been rarely used.28 Legal provisions also have 
been introduced in new or reestablished democracies, such as in eight Latin 
American, six African (in four cases, there is only the recall of MPs), four 
Asian, and three Oceanian countries. We may notice here, despite a common 
assumption relating direct democracy with small states, Anckar has shown that 
although micro states and small islands have a “special inclination to introduce 
in their constitutions prescriptions for the constitutional referendum, [they] 
are otherwise equally or even more disinterested than large countries in more 
differentiated instruments of direct democracy.”29
There are explanations for the low number of countries with legal provisions 
for bottom-up direct democracy. One reason is that, in Setälä’s words, “these 
types of referendums are beyond the control of governments and they may 
be directed against the policies pursued by governments.”30 Therefore, it may 
be expected that they receive opposition from the parties most likely to be in 
power. A referendum may also bring about rather unexpected results. It has 
been shown that many voters decide on which way to vote during the campaign, 
and, in some cases, there were changing trends until the very last day of the 
campaign.31 However, there is no homogeneous pattern, as is shown for some 
Latin American countries such as Ecuador, Venezuela, Colombia, and Bolivia, 
28 Maja Harris, “New Zealand’s Direct Democracy Experience: An Institution Found Lacking?” 
C2D Working Paper, no. 34 (2010).
29 Dag Anckar “Direct Democracy in Microstates and Small Island States,” World Development 
32, no. 2 (2004): 387. 
30 Setälä, “Referendums in Western Europe,” 337.
31 Claes H. de Vreese, “Political Parties in Dire Straits? Consequences of National Referendums 
for Political Parties,” Party Politics 12, no. 5 (2006): 581-598.
78  |  Taiwan Journal of Democracy, Volume 8, No. 1
where the spread of direct democracy institutions created mandatory top-
down and bottom-up mechanisms, surrounded by a public discourse oriented 
toward reinvigorating democracy. Despite this fact, it should be stressed that, 
in Latin America, top-down referendums are used more frequently, with some 
mandatory referendums and only two experiences of bottom-up referendums 
as the exceptions (one recall in Venezuela, 2004, and an initiative in Colombia 
asking for the introduction of direct democracy into the constitution).32
In nineteen of the thirty-eight countries with institutional provisions for 
direct democracy from the bottom up, the mechanism has been activated at 
least once. If Estonia, which had provisions for the mechanism before the 
First World War (but not after), is included, we can say that bottom-up direct 
democracy has been activated in twenty countries worldwide at least once. 
Switzerland emerges as the most intensive user of direct democracy. Bottom-
up direct democracy was introduced in 1874. Switzerland was followed many 
years later by Liechtenstein (1925), Italy (1974,) and San Marino (1982). 
Additionally, countries such as Uruguay (where the mechanism was first in the 
hands of parties and after 1967 included legal provision for citizens’ initiatives) 
and Latvia (introduced in 1923 and reestablished after the communist period) 
have used the mechanism several times. With the exception of Switzerland and 
Liechtenstein, the spread of direct democracy among countries and regions 
is a recent phenomenon, starting in the 1980s (Italy could be considered a 
forerunner in the middle of the 1970s). However, bottom-up direct democracy 
has to be understood as a rather ephemeral institution. Apart from the already 
mentioned ones, only four countries, Latvia, Uruguay, Hungary,33 and 
Slovakia, have used the institution repeatedly, on a minor scale, while in most 
cases, referendum calls have been a unique experience so far (Colombia, 1991; 
Serbia, 1992; Georgia, 2003; Macedonia, 2004; Ukraine, 2000; and Venezuela, 
2004).
How can this variance and recent growth in use be explained? Arend 
Lijphart’s well-known study on majoritarian and consensual democracies 
comes to the conclusion that the question of why referendums occur in some 
countries more frequently than in others cannot be answered satisfactorily. 
Regarding the very specific case of direct democracy from the bottom, the 
question is not only about the use but also about the reasons for the introduction 
of legal provisions. Why should political groups or parties in office be inclined to 
introduce mechanisms that can reduce their power and challenge their decisions? 
Our fieldwork does not allow us to present conclusions; however, preliminary 
32 Yanina Welp. “El referéndum en América Latina. Diseños institucionales y equilibrios de 
poder” [The referendum in Latin America : Institutional designs and balances of power] Nueva 
Sociedad [New Society] 208 (2010): 26-42.
33 László Komáromi, “Popular Rights in Hungary: A Brief Overview of Ideas, Institutions and 
Practice from the Late 18th Century until Our Days,” C2D Working Paper Series, no. 35 
(2010).
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research on particular cases suggests that there is neither a single reason nor 
an overarching trend. In Switzerland, for example, two main influences are 
usually cited concerning the introduction of direct democratic mechanisms into 
the constitutions of the cantons during the nineteenth century: the premodern 
Landsgemeinde (decisions taken in the open space by a show of hands) and 
the French Revolution, both of which served as cultural reference models 
for political opposition groups. However, looking at historical trajectories of 
Swiss cantons introducing direct democracy, the political constellations and 
motivations leading to this step were far from homogeneous.34 In the American 
states, direct democracy blossomed throughout the Progressive Era in response 
to government corruption.35 If, in the mentioned cases, the main supporting 
factor seems to have been social pressure, in other cases, provisions for direct 
democracy were promoted by the central power. Comparing the introduction 
of direct democracy in South America, Barczak suggests that new constitutions 
can be expected to contain direct democratic mechanisms when the reform 
and rewriting process is controlled by traditionally excluded political interests; 
or when, under conditions of extreme institutional stress, formerly excluded 
interests mobilize to capture a significant, but not controlling, share of the 
authority over the reform process.36 In other words, referendums can be 
seen as weapons to overthrow institutional constraints. Of course, it opens 
the door for a very controversial debate when these regimes-often defined 
as populist-can base themselves on strong popular support. In the Peruvian 
case, it was the result of Alberto Fujimori’s attempt to resolve the institutional 
crisis produced by his coup d’état in 1992. His intention was to unblock 
the international ban he faced by promoting a constitutional convention 
introducing several mechanisms of bottom-up direct democracy. However, 
although the 1993 constitution created a referendum system, the government 
blocked the opposition’s effort to submit the re-election issue to a popular vote 
and other attempts to reinforce decentralization and to strengthen democratic 
institutions.37 Besides this rather organic emergence in countries such as 
34 Wolf Linder, “Direct Democracy,” in Handbook of Swiss Politics, ed. Ulrich Klöti, Peter Knoepfel, 
Hanspeter Kriesi, Wolf Linder, Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini (Zürich: Neue Zürcher 
Zeitung Publishing, 2007), 102-103. Also see, Andreas Auer, ed., Les origines de la démocratie 
directe en Suisse-Die Ursprünge der schweizerischen direkten Demokratie [The origins of 
direct democracy in Switzerland] (Basle/Frankfurt a. M.: Helbing & Lichtenhahn, 1996), and 
René Roca and Andreas Auer, eds., Wege zur direkten Demokratie in den schweizerischen 
Kantonen [Ways to direct democracy in the Swiss cantons] (Zürich: Schulthess, 2011).
35 Todd Donovan and Shaun Bowler, “An Overview of Direct Democracy in the American States,” 
in Citizens as Legislators: Direct Democracy in the United States, ed. Shaun Bowler et al. 
(Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1998)
36 Mónica Barczak, “Representation by Consultation? The Rise of Direct Democracy in Latin 
America,” Latin American Politics & Society 43, no. 3 (2001): 39.
37 Steven Levitsky, “Fujimori and Post-Party Politics in Peru,” Journal of Democracy 10, no. 3 
(1999): 78-92.
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Switzerland and the United States, the democratization wave in Latin America 
during the 1980s and the fall of the Berlin Wall opened a historic opportunity for 
countries of the former Eastern bloc to introduce direct democratic elements into 
their constitutions. However, compared to the frequency of referendum votes, 
studies about direct democracy in Eastern European countries are still scant. 
In his assessment of direct democracy in the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS), Wheatley stresses that, although most of the twelve republics 
possess a formally democratic system in terms of a constitution that guarantees 
a multiparty system and universal human rights, this façade of democracy often 
obscures an underlying informal reality in which political life is determined by 
raw power struggles unrestrained by the rule of law.38 Furthermore, despite a 
legal framework allowing for a number of mechanisms of direct democracy, 
they are either hardly used or (worse) suborned by an authoritarian leadership 
in order to exert control. On occasions, citizens’ initiatives have been hijacked 
by the authorities or by economic agents with close links to the authorities (as 
in the 2000 referendum in Ukraine).
With the data at hand representing the universe of all cases and the 
threefold functional typology of bottom-up referendums (power concentration, 
party competition, and civil society empowerment), we hope to go beyond 
and further contribute to the two viewpoints we currently find in the literature. 
Arendt Lijphart and Butler and Ranney, focusing on Western polities, stated that 
governments are basically in control of referendum votes. They seem to stand 
corrected by Mads Qvortrup’s investigation-applying Gordon Smith’s model 
dividing referendums into “controlled” and “uncontrolled”-demonstrating 
that a large majority (77 percent) of referendums are actually uncontrolled.39 
However, they both had cases only from Western polities under study, and, 
according to us, by including mandatory constitutional referendums as well as 
top-down organized plebiscites, did not focus on cases in which the citizens 
have had the option of playing an active role in triggering the referendum 
vote.
Turning Bottom-Up Referendums Upside Down
The question whether global patterns are emerging thus can be explored and 
we can try to better understand the role of direct democracy in representative 
democracies. To proceed with the analysis, referendums were classified 
38 Jonathan Wheatley, “Direct Democracy in the Commonwealth of Independent States: The State 
of the Art,” C2D Working Paper, no. 28 (2008).
39 Arendt Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in 
Twenty-One Countries (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1984); David Butler and 
Austin Ranney, Referendums: A Comparative Study of Practice and Theory (Washington, DC: 
American Enterprise Institute, 1994); and Mads Qvortrup, “Are Referendums Controlled and 
Pro-hegemonic?” Political Studies 48, no. 4 (2000): 821-826.
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according to what group initiated the request (political party in government, 
political party in the opposition, or civil society organizations). The main 
promoter can usually be identified by looking at the committee created to 
collect signatures. However, in some cases, it was difficult to categorize the 
initiator as a political party in the opposition or civil society, given that there 
were shared efforts between actors from both sides. In a subsection below, 
some cases are explored in more detail in order to identify the existence of 
more actors involved in the support of a bottom-up referendum.
Table 2 shows the evolution of bottom-up direct democracy according to 
countries and promoters of a vote. The time periods were chosen to emphasise 
this evolution in waves of bottom-up direct democracy. We are well aware 
that time periods could easily and for good reasons be set differently. The 
first developments of modern direct democracy happened from 1874 to 1920 
and evolved in coexistence with representative institutions. The first period 
identified shows Switzerland as the only country with referendum practice and 
political parties as key activators of the votes. Of the forty-four consultations 
that took place in those forty-six years, 64 percent (twenty-eight) were initiated 
by political parties in the opposition. The referendums called in that period 
represent 8.2 percent of the total registered until 2009.
Between 1921 and 1950, more countries with bottom-up votes emerged. 
Estonia showed only exceptional usage, while the Latvian experience, which 
was interrupted during the communist period, was reestablished only recently. 
Liechtenstein also became an adopter during this period and since has developed 
to be comparable to the Swiss experience.40 Political parties maintain an 
important role as initiators (parties in the opposition activated 42.4 percent), 
but civil society clearly gained in importance (56.1 percent). However, the 
weight of Switzerland should be stressed, given that organizations in Swiss 
civil society activate referendums more and more frequently. In Latvia, the 
opposition is the main actor, and in Liechtenstein, both parties and civil society 
organizations resort to referendums.
In the post-World War II period from 1951 through 1988, there were 
five countries (although with varying intensity) in which bottom-up direct 
democracy played a fundamental role. Compared to the previous period, San 
Marino, Uruguay,41 and Italy entered the set of countries with bottom-up direct 
democracy, while Latvia and Estonia dropped out. Due to the influence of the 
Swiss case, civil society initiated most of the calls during this period of time 
(54.3 percent). Again, a sharp increase of the total number of referendums 
compared with the previous period can be observed.
40 For more information on the case, see Wilfried Marxer and Zoltán Tibor Pállinger, Direkte 
Demokratie in der Schweiz und Liechtenstein: Systemkontexte und Effekte [Direct democracy 
in Switzerland and Liechtenstein: Systems contexts and effects] (Bendern, Liechtenstein: 
Liechtenstein-Institut, 2006).
41 We thank Alicia Lissidini, who helped us to understand and classify the Uruguayan case.
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Finally, after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the third wave of 
democratization, several more countries started to introduce legal provisions 
for bottom-up direct democracy and to use them (with more than half of the 
total number of calls in history so far: 53.4 percent). This has occurred not 
only in post-communist countries but also in other regions of the world, albeit 
with different intensity and under varying circumstances. Currently, nineteen 
countries have used bottom-up mechanisms of direct democracy. Liechtenstein 
has followed a similar development as Switzerland, with an increased presence 
of civil society organizations for the activation of the referendum.42 Uruguay, 
although to a lesser extent, seems to follow this path. Civil society, again, is 
the main actor, but the figure is distorted by the Swiss experiences, followed 
by Liechtenstein and Uruguay, where referendums have been activated more 
often by civil society than by political parties.
We created table 3 to further highlight the importance of Switzerland 
and Liechtenstein for the activation of bottom-up referendums worldwide 
(73 percent of all cases). As mentioned before, over time, Switzerland and 
Liechtenstein have developed into a mode with only a few votes initiated by 
governmental parties, a considerable number of votes triggered by opposition 
parties, but the bulk of bottom-up referendums stemming from political forces 
rooted in civil society (including trade unions, workers’ unions, and employers’ 
associations). We also can observe that, for the rest of the world, political 
parties in the opposition have been the most active initiators of bottom-up 
votes (71 percent of the calls initiated in the world, excluding Switzerland 
and Liechtenstein). Countries in this last group have a shorter history, are less 
practiced in the use of direct democracy, and are sometimes characterized by 
fierce party antagonisms (as in Italy). However, there seems to be a temporal 
trend as well. Bottom-up direct democratic mechanisms, in a first phase, are 
a tool in the hands of political parties. At some point, in an open and liberal 
society with a certain experience in the use of direct democracy, civil society 
organizations take over, fulfilling the task of political watchdogs, demanding 
a vote whenever societal preferences do not seem in line with what political 
parties produce as policy outputs any more. Regarding the Swiss case, it is 
worthwhile noting that 13 percent of the bottom-up referendum votes have 
been initiated by political parties in government. In a polity with strong direct 
democratic instruments such as in Switzerland, even political parties in the 
governing coalition need to reassess themselves and their electorate from time 
to time, and prove that they can initiate, and eventually even win, a referendum 
vote.
42 A peculiarity of the bottom-up mechanisms in Liechtenstein is that popular votes are binding 
for Parliament but not necessarily for the Prince (the country is a constitutional monarchy). In 
most cases, he has a veto right. If he does not sign a law, it cannot enter into force, even if an 
overwhelming majority of the people at the ballot favor it.
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Furthermore, we can calculate a success rate from the perspective of the 
initiators, expressing how many of the bottom-up votes were accepted by the 
electorate (see table 4). Again, we distinguish Switzerland and Liechtenstein 
from the rest of the world. Overall, the success rate of bottom-up referendums 
amounts to roughly a third, irrespective of differences in institutional design of 
direct democratic instruments, political party systems, or polity. In Switzerland, 
for example, 106 of 336 (figure from table 3) votes passed. Overall, with a one- 
third success rate, the price to launch a referendum vote is high but worth the 
effort. Referendums initiated by civil society clearly have the highest chance 
of passing compared to the two other types, with 35 percent in Switzerland, 
44 percent in Liechtenstein,43 and even 57 percent in the rest of the world. The 
high success rates for this type of referendum justify the function it can have in 
a political system as a corrective and safety valve. However, the high success 
rate of government-induced bottom-up referendums with a rate of 57 percent 
again shows that bottom-up direct democracy also can be turned upside down 
and used as a tool to further consolidate political power.
Applying a more qualitative approach to the empirical evidence listed 
above, we can analyze to what extent referendum calls could be linked to 
the suggested scenarios and even go a bit further to differentiate within those 
scenarios. In other words, we ask to what extent direct democracy from below 
is (1) activated by individuals or civil society as a consequence of a crisis of 
Table 3. Referendums by Initiator for Switzerland, 
Liechtenstein, and Rest of the World
Initiator
Total
Government Political party in the opposition
Individuals or 
civil society
Σ % Σ % Σ % Σ %
Switzerland 44 13.1   91 27.1 201 59.8 336   62.6
Liechtenstein   3   5.4   19 33.9   34 60.7   56   10.4
Rest of the world 14   9.7 103 71.0   28 19.3 145   27.0
Total 61 11.4 213 40.0 263 48.6 537 100.0
Source: C2D database, www.c2d.ch.
43 We are aware that success rates in Switzerland vary to a considerable extent between the 
citizens’ initiative (very low) and the referendum (high). See Wilfried Marxer and Tibor 
Pállinger, “System Contexts and System Effects of Direct Democracy-Direct Democracy in 
Liechtenstein and Switzerland Compared,” in Direct Democracy in Europe: Developments and 
Prospects, ed. Zoltán Tibor Pállinger, Bruno Kaufmann, Wilfried Marxer, and Theo Schiller 
(Wiesbaden, Germany: VS Verlag, 2007), 24. However, for our purpose, we place the emphasis 
on the bottom-up procedure.
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representative democracy and/or by the demands of more participatory forms 
of democracy; (2) called by opposition parties which activate a referendum 
as a mechanism to bypass a resolution, placing the decision in the hands of 
citizenry, or initiated by small, radical and/or single-issue parties, even if they 
know that their possibilities of winning are low, simply to mobilize and place 
the issue on the political agenda; or (3) more or less directly promoted by 
governments for purposes of gaining legitimacy or the enlargement of political 
power.
Challenging Representative Democracy?
Direct democracy activated by the people could be characterized by the divorce 
between civil society and institutions of representative democracy, or just by 
the emergence of the citizenry as one more player in the political arena. Even 
if this challenges representative democracy, political parties are not excluded 
necessarily from the process, as can be observed in the Uruguayan case (see 
below).
Empirical findings suggest that bottom-up referendums have been used in 
different contexts, as shown by the early experience in Estonia (1933), where a 
fascist regime was created through direct democracy from the bottom. In other 
scenarios, direct democracy can provide a tool for the citizenry to become 
an actor in the political game. This was the case in Georgia, when in 2003, 
a coalition of NGOs was successful in collecting 218,000 signatures to force 
a referendum trying to reduce the number of members of the parliament for 
economical reasons and also to make it easier to gather sufficient members 
to fulfill the quorum during sessions. However, a new attempt to bring about 
political reform, driven by the opposition parties and an NGO, was rejected by 
the Central Electoral Commission, which claimed that the procedure did not 
suit the requests (presentation of signatures), while the sponsors dismissed the 
Table 4. Success Rates of Bottom-Up Votes for Switzerland, 
Liechtenstein, and Rest of the World
Initiator
Total
Government Political party in the opposition
Individuals or 
civil society
Σ % passed Σ % passed Σ % passed Σ %
Switzerland 11 25,0 25 27,5   70 34,8 106 31,5
Liechtenstein   0   0,0   4 21,1   15 44,1   19 33,9
Rest of the world   8 57,1 24 23,3   16 57,1   48 33,1
Total 19 31,1 53 24,9 101 38,4 173 32,2
Source: C2D archives.
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legal arguments as unconstitutional.44
In Colombia (1991), students initiated an informal referendum to propose 
a constitutional amendment for a more participatory regime. The government 
recognized the process, a new official referendum was called, and the proposal 
was included in a constitutional amendment.45 In New Zealand, the Citizens 
Initiated Referenda Act (1993) was approved for the purpose of providing “for 
the holding, on specific questions, of citizens initiated referenda, the results of 
which referenda will indicate the views held by the people of New Zealand…
but will not be binding... .” There were some submissions but, according 
to Morris, the act appeared to have fallen into disuse in part because of the 
nonbinding character of the mechanism, reinforced by the lack of reaction 
by the government in the face of the results.46 Despite this, there was a new 
submission in 2009.
With the exception of Italy, the most intensive users of direct democracy 
(Switzerland, Liechtenstein, San Marino, and more recently, Uruguay) are 
characterized by a well-organized civil society with a high social capital and 
links to political parties. Even if the scenario of referendum votes induced by 
civil society challenges the exclusive structure of representative democracies, 
there need not necessarily be a divorce.
In Uruguay, the mechanism of direct democracy was included in the 
constitution before the third wave of democratization, and played a central 
role in shaping the current political system. Bottom-up popular referendums 
activated by signature collections were developed by political parties in the 
1950s and 1960s. Lissidini considers the proposals for constitutional reform 
promoted by referendums in 1958, 1962, and 1966 as authoritarian attempts to 
change the prevailing political equation in favor of a single executive power. 
After the restoration of democracy in 1985, a new wave of popular initiatives 
emerged. Citizens have initiated this mechanism on numerous occasions. The 
first occurred in 1989, when an independent committee of political parties 
was organized to collect signatures and activate a referendum to repeal the 
law that prevented an expiration date for the prosecution of those responsible 
for crimes committed during the dictatorship. The referendum took place but 
a majority vetoed the bill. Yet, this experience paved the way for initiatives 
that would occur in subsequent years. Altman notes that direct democracy in 
Uruguay was the result of an almost natural extension of the game of political 
44 Hwang, Direct Democracy in Asia.
45 Thomas Acuña Evaristo, “Colombia: entre la crisis de representación y la democracia directa” 
[Columbia : Between the crisis of representation and direct democracy], in Armas de Doble Filo. 
La participación ciudadana en la encrucijada [Double-edged weapons: Citizen participation at 
the crossroads], ed. Yanina Welp and Uwe Serdült (Buenos Aires: Prometeo, 2009), 109-128.
46 Caroline Morris, “Improving Our Democracy or a Fraud on the Community? A Closer Look at 
New Zealand’s Citizens Initiated Referenda Act 1993,” Statute Law Review 25, no. 2 (2004): 
116-135.
July 2012  |  87
parties.47 Civil organizations (independent commissions, trade unions, and 
pensioners) promoted abrogative or constitutional referendums in most of 
the cases, with the support of the political party Frente Amplio. During the 
1990s, the Frente Amplio emerged as a powerful coalition able to challenge the 
traditional Uruguayan bipartite system, which finally happened successfully 
when the Frente Amplio came into power in 2004. Referendums were part of 
the party’s strategy, with successive demonstrations against the government 
and, in particular, against its privatization policy, which allowed the party to 
increase its presence and strengthen its networks in society. But referendums 
also allowed civil society to decide, through a democratic mechanism, on 
policies perceived as crucial for the future of the country’s welfare state and to 
become a veto player.
In Switzerland, the emergence and further development of direct democracy 
is closely coupled with political movements representing the minority 
of conservative Catholics and, later on, the union workers’ movement.48 
These movements used mechanisms of direct democracy to mobilize their 
followers and to oppose the dominant political parties in power, which, in 
turn, helped them to eventually consolidate as political parties, namely as the 
Christian and Social Democratic Parties. Without ever having experienced 
the disruptive effect of autocratic rulers or the destruction of the country by 
wars, Switzerland’s bottom-up mechanisms of direct democracy were applied 
with increasing frequency by nonpartisan interest associations, public action 
committees, social movement organizations, and even by individuals.
When Bottom-Up Referendums Are Initiated by Opposition Parties
Conflict Resolution
There is a difference between political parties in the opposition and political 
parties in power, given the risk of using (illegally) public means to run a 
campaign. However, there are cases in which an initiative organized by the 
government can be answered by another launched by the opposition. This 
happened in Taiwan where the four referendums in 2008 confronted two bills 
introduced by the ruling party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), and 
two by the opposition party, the Kuomintang Party (KMT). Corruption control 
and the status of Taiwan in relation to China were the axes of confrontation 
between the parties. 
47 David Altman, “Uruguay: La Suiza de América Latina” [Uruguay: The Switzerland of Latin 
America], in Armas de Doble Filo. La participación ciudadana en la encrucijada, ed. Yanina 
Welp and Uwe Serdült (Buenos Aires: Prometeo, 2009), 63-86.
48 Paolo Dardanelli, “The Emergence and Evolution of Democracy in Switzerland,” in Achieving 
Democracy: Democratization in Theory and Practice, ed. Mary Fran T. Malone (London: 
Continuum, 2011), 141-162.
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In Slovakia, a referendum has been initiated at least five times, though 
there were more attempts to summon referendums. Belko and Kopecek 
describe the quirks employed by the government to prevent the realization 
of these consultations by alleging unconstitutionality or changing the rules of 
the game.49 The People’s Party Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) 
used the first referendum vote while being in the opposition (1996 and 1997), 
and then again while in government (1998). Venezuela (2004) is the only case 
of an attempted recall of the president (failed), demonstrating the extreme 
conflict between the opposition and the government, which was addressed by 
calling citizens to vote. This case was resolved in favor of the government, 
with the confirmation of the mandate of President Hugo Chávez.50
In terms of the confrontation between parties or between parliament and the 
government or the president, referendums have been used frequently to reject 
laws. This occurred in the Former Yugoslav Republic (FYR) of Macedonia in 
2004, when opposition parties gathered signatures to prevent the advancement 
of a bill seeking to amend the country’s territorial divisions. It also happened 
in Lithuania (1994), Hungary (2004), and Uruguay (2003), where opposition 
parties organized to reject privatization promoted by their respective 
governments, with strong support from some civil society organizations such 
as labor unions.
In Hungary, the referendums of 2004 and 2008 had a strong effect on 
domestic politics. In 2008, the government was defeated, showing that popular 
votes have worked more than just to empower the people and as another 
instrument in the hands of elites. This situation led Reti to assert that direct 
democracy is not yet an alternative or even a supplement to partisan politics, 
but rather an organic part of it. As the Hungarian and other cases have shown, 
the parties have set the questions and people have voted mostly according to 
their party affiliations.51 However, there are exceptions to this rule.52
49 Marian Belko and Lubomir Kopecek, “Referendum in Theory and Practice: The History of the 
Slovak Referendums and Their Consequences,” CEPSR, 2003, http://www.cepsr.com/clanek.
php?ID=165 (accessed August 29, 2011).
50 Miriam Kornblith, “The Referendum in Venezuela: Elections versus Democracy,” Journal of 
Democracy 16, (2007): 124-137. The deadlock between the government and the opposition may 
involve conflicts between state and regions, as happened in Ecuador in 2000, and in Peru during 
Alberto Fujimori’s government, and then during the presidency of Alan García.
51 Partly cited from, Pál Reti, “Hungary: Direct Democracy in an Antagonistic Society,” in Global 
Citizens in Charge: How Modern Direct Democracy Can Make Our Representative Democracy 
Truly Representative, ed. Lee Jung-Ok and Bruno Kaufmann (Seoul: Korea Democracy 
Foundation, 2009), 211-220.
52 In 2008, about 82-84 percent said “Yes” to the questions of the oppositional party FIDESZ, and 
only 16-18 percent said “No,” following the opinion of the governing Socialist Party. However, 
the party preferences were FIDESZ, 62 percent, and Socialist Party, 29 percent. For a study 
on that issue, see LeDuc Lawrence, “Opinion Change and Voting Behavior in Referendums,” 
European Journal of Political Research 41, no. 6 (2002): 711-732.
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Placing Issues on the Political Agenda
The political system of Italy is the paradigmatic case of what has been called 
a “partidocracia,” a system dominated by political parties. The only bottom-
up direct democratic mechanism provided for in the Italian constitution is the 
abrogative referendum. One of the peculiarities of the Italian referendum is 
that it has been used extensively by opposition parties and political groups. The 
entire system shows how the parties have learned to control and neutralize the 
referendum in different ways, ranging from the early dissolution of parliament 
(which allows the parties to gain time by delaying the consultation), to avoiding 
subjects whose treatment could cause the call of a referendum and/or campaign 
for abstention to prevent the referendum’s being valid (given the requirement 
of a 50 percent quorum established by the Italian constitution). Setälä suggests 
that findings such as this may be interpreted as an indication of an increasing 
sentiment felt by political activists and citizens that the representative system 
and the traditional parties do not adequately reflect the interests and matters that 
they consider important. Since the 1970s, consultations have been dominated by 
various issues (from the opposition to divorce and abortion and the emergence 
of an environmental movement to topics such as the regulation of campaigns 
or antitrust laws in the media) and with varying degrees of homogeneity within 
each party. Partnerships have been multiple and varied.
New, radical, or single-issue parties have used referendums, even when 
knowing in advance that they have few chances of being successful. Uleri 
suggests that, in Italy, “most of the initiatives were promoted to force issues 
onto the political agenda that would otherwise have been excluded.”53
In Slovakia, referendums also have been used to mobilize at the grass-roots 
level. This happened when the Slovak Workers Union Party held a consultation 
in 1994 as a response to having been left out of the parliament. The number 
of voters proved to be insufficient to increase the party’s support or to gain its 
visibility. The referendum promoted by the HZDS in the government sought to 
improve public opinion of the administration, although the vote again lacked 
sufficient voter turnout. There were two further consultations in 2000 and 
2004, driven by opposition parties against government policies.54
The Authoritarian Temptation
When the government initiates a referendum through a signature collection, a 
similar context to the one described for some top-down referendums (mainly 
in nonconsolidated democracies) could be expected. The ruling party decides 
53 Uleri, “On Referendum Voting in Italy,” 868.
54 Erik Láštic, “Referendum Experience in Slovakia: A Long and Winding Road,” in Direct 
Democracy in Europe: Developments and Prospects, ed. Zoltán Tibor Pállinger, Bruno 
Kaufmann, Wilfried Marxer, and Theo Schiller (Wiesbaden, Germany: VS Verlag, 2007), 189-
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to gather signatures and promote consultation either because a presidential 
referendum is not foreseen in the constitution or to provide a veneer of 
legitimacy to a consultation. Often the aim is to resolve a deadlock with an 
adverse parliamentary majority and/or to increase the power of the government 
through political reform. In Ukraine, the referendum of 2000 supposedly 
originated from a popular initiative signed by around four million citizens. 
However, the collection of signatures allegedly was organized by President 
Leonid Kuchma and his supporters. The speed and way in which the signatures 
were collected produced uncertainty regarding the legality of the process. The 
proposals were clearly oriented toward reinforcing presidential power: (1) to 
give the president the right to dissolve parliament if it failed to form a majority 
or to approve a state budget, (2) to limit the immunity of parliamentary 
deputies from criminal prosecution, (3) to reduce the number of parliamentary 
deputies from 450 to 300, (4) to establish a bicameral parliament, (5) to 
allow the constitution to be amended by referendum alone, and (6) to allow 
the president to dissolve parliament if voters expressed no confidence in the 
body in a national referendum. Despite violations occurring in the vote and 
pressure on all executive branches of power to deliver a favorable outcome, 
the constitutional changes were not passed, as President Kuchma was unable 
to gather the required two-thirds majority in parliament.55
The experience of Palau (five referendums called by the supporters of the 
president in 2004) was also a response to the deadlock between the government 
and parliament, which the president decided to resolve by appealing directly 
to the citizenry.
Conclusions
Our overview has shown that, despite a growing interest in mechanisms of 
direct democracy activated by the citizenry at the national level, neither the 
rules enabling these calls nor the practices are widespread. Though at least 
156 countries provide some form of referendum, it is only in thirty-eight that 
provision exists for citizens to initiate them. Even this number is reduced when 
we note that in six of these countries it is only possible to activate a recall 
against members of parliament (Russian Federation, Ethiopia, Kyrgyzstan, 
Nigeria, Liberia, and Uganda).
Second, the association of the spread of bottom-up direct democracy with 
a crisis of representative democracy taking place in consolidated democracies 
of the West is contradicted by empirical evidence presented in this essay. 
With the exceptions of Switzerland, Italy, San Marino, and Liechtenstein, it 
is not in the Western countries where the growth of this type of referendum is 
occurring. Only in Italy can the use of referendums be linked with a crisis of 
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representative democracy, even if political parties are the most active users. 
In the other three countries, the mechanism is linked more with the political 
culture than with a particular contemporary crisis.
Post-communist countries stand out, in particular. Fourteen of them have 
legal provisions for bottom-up referendums, while nine have exercised such 
a referendum at least once (Latvia, Slovakia, Lithuania, Hungary, Slovenia, 
Ukraine, Serbia, Georgia, and Macedonia). Only twenty countries (including 
Estonia, whose constitution does not currently provide for referendums by 
popular initiative) have enabled bottom-up direct democracy on occasion. No 
African country has exercised the mechanism; while there have been three 
events in Latin America (Colombia, Venezuela, and Uruguay) and two in 
Asia. A trend in the performance of this device can be observed in only a few 
countries because the practices, although not numerous, have been established 
for a considerable period-Switzerland (since 1874), Latvia (from 1923 to 
1934, and since 1998), Liechtenstein (since 1925), Uruguay (since 1958), Italy 
(since 1974), San Marino (since 1982), Hungary (since 1990), and Slovakia 
(since 1994).
Our research has shown that direct democracy from the bottom, even if 
still rare, has been increasing over time, from the one country that used it from 
1874 to 1920 (Switzerland), to few that provided it from 1921 to 1988, until the 
present in which nineteen countries around the world have used it since the end 
of the 1980s (while thirty-eight have provisions). Not only have new players 
emerged, but also there are new trends. The pattern is not homogeneous. While 
Switzerland or Liechtenstein displays a growing importance of civil society’s 
activating referendums, in Hungary or Latvia, opposition parties have initiated 
most of the calls, and in countries such as Ukraine, the government organized 
the referendum, although through a social movement.
Far from a divorce between representative and direct democracy, on 
the contrary, political parties play a prominent role in the activation of this 
mechanism. The party in government or, as in Ukraine, the president and his 
supporters, have resorted directly to a referendum after collecting signatures. 
Here, bottom-up direct democracy shows a similar pattern to top-down direct 
democracy. Further, direct democracy allows parties to defend their positions 
after losing in parliament by, for instance, promoting a veto (abrogative 
referendum) as has happened in Uruguay and Lithuania. In this situation, 
direct democracy can help to reduce the distance between representatives 
and citizens, although further research is required to analyze this in depth. 
Finally, new, small, or single-issue parties can activate direct democracy as 
a mechanism to mobilize and/or place a subject on the political agenda, as 
happened in Italy through the referendums activated by the Radical Party.
Switzerland and Liechtenstein have evolved into a sustained model in 
which strong civil society organizations have gained enough importance and 
organizational capacity to activate direct democracy. These two countries, 
however, are clearly an exception. Direct democracy has existed for decades 
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in free and open society, where the social capital necessary to use or further 
develop the institutional mechanisms was able to form. Further investigation 
is needed to analyze to what extent this reflects a split between political parties 
and citizens. The Uruguayan experience, which also follows this pattern, shows 
that the parties (in particular, the Frente Amplio) have been active players in 
triggering a referendum, even though civil society organizations have recently 
taken the lead.
In this essay, we have asked about the functions of direct democracy 
on national and global levels, and tried to identify typical patterns. We 
have identified three types of direct democratic experiences and functions: 
(1) concentration of power, which feeds to critics of mechanisms of direct 
democracy, (2) party competition, with a predominantly strategic use that 
reinforces party struggles (on the positive side, it maintains party competition 
and helps political minorities), and (3) citizen empowerment, overall 
positive but somewhat eroding the power of political parties. We suspect a 
sound balance between models two and three to have a beneficial effect on 
democracies. Further research will have to show whether an empirical linkage 
between the three broad functions of direct democracy and the performance of 
political systems can be established. Throughout the essay, we have identified 
at least four additional topics for further research: (1) the conditions and 
political motivations under which direct democracy mechanisms have been 
introduced into a constitution should be explored in a more systematic way; 
(2) the documentation and comparative study of the much larger subnational 
experience of referendum voting is highly desirable; (3) the links among party 
systems, government coalitions, and the use of direct democracy mechanisms 
should be explored in greater detail; and (4) the pattern we have found for 
success rates and effects deserves additional exploration.
